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ABSTRACT
Pre-trial risk assessment tools are used to make recommen-
dations to judges about appropriate conditions of pre-trial
supervision for people who have been arrested. Increasingly,
there is concern about whether these models are operating
fairly, including concerns about whether the models’ input
factors are fair measures of one’s criminal activity. In this
paper, we assess the impact of booking charges that do not
result in a conviction on a popular risk assessment tool, the
Arnold Public Safety Assessment. Using data from a pilot
run of the tool in San Francisco, CA, we nd that booking
charges that do not result in a conviction (i.e. charges that
are dropped or end in an acquial) increased the recom-
mended level of pre-trial supervision in around 27% of cases
evaluated by the tool.
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1 INTRODUCTION
When a person is arrested a decision is made as to whether
that person should be released before their case has con-
cluded and, if so, under what conditions. Such decisions
take many factors into account, including the risks of re-
leasing that person back into the community. Actuarial risk
assessment– statistical models that output a defendant’s esti-
mated risk (oen risk of re-arrest or risk of failure to appear
for court)– are increasingly used to aid decision-makers in
this highly consequential decision.
Recently, concerns have been raised about the fairness
of risk assessment models in the criminal justice context,
particularly around race-based discrimination [1]. Much of
the technical discussion in this area has centered around
dening the fairness of a model in terms of racial parity
along several, potentially conicting, measures of predictive
performance [2, 3, 5, 11, 18, 19]. Other concerns about risk
assessment focus on the (un)fairness of the inputs to the
models [7, 10]. For example, [9] has argued that the use of
criminal history in risk assessment serves as a proxy for race
and predictive models that rely upon this factor serve to
justify the continued over-incarceration of minorities. [15]
oers a discussion of many of the arguments supporting and
refuting the fairness of risk assessment in criminal justice.
In this paper, we explore the “fairness” of one particular
input of a popular risk assessment tool. Using data provided
by the San Francisco Public Defender’s Oce (SFPD), we
evaluate how oen “overbooking”— booking an arrested
person under charges that are higher than may be warranted
by the facts of the case— inuences Arnold Ventures’1 Public
Safety Assessment (PSA). Specically, using data from a pilot
run of the model in mid 2016 to mid 2017 in San Francisco,
CA, we investigate how oen charges that are ultimately
unsubstantiated by the courts cause the PSA to make more
restrictive recommendations than it would have if it had
only used charges for which the person was ultimately found
guilty. Allowing unsubstantiated charges to increase one’s
pre-trial supervision recommendations runs counter to an
intuitive notion of fairness in the sense that charges that are
ultimately dropped or not suciently supported by the facts
of the case to result in a conviction ought not to be used to
justify more restrictive release conditions. us, this work
assesses the fairness of the model both from the point of view
of the inputs as well as their eects on the predictions and
recommendations of the tool. To our knowledge, this is the
rst study of its kind to analyze the eect of charge-based
inputs to risk assessment in this way.
In Section 2 we give context for and dene overbooking for
the purposes of our analysis. Section 3 gives a description of
the risk assessment model we study here, the PSA, including
a discussion of how booking charges are factored into the
ultimate recommendations of the model. In Section 4, we
describe the data we used in the analysis, and in Section 5,
we describe how we analyzed the data. Section 6 presents
our ndings, Section 7 discusses the limitations of the the
work, and Section 8 concludes.
2 OVERBOOKING
We assess the impact of overbooking on the PSA in San
Francisco, CA over several months in 2016 and 2017. e
local context here is important. According to a recent report
based on an examination of cases taken on by the SFPD [16],
“[p]eople of color receive more serious charges at the initial
1Formerly the Laura and John Arnold Foundation
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booking stage, reecting decisions made by ocers of the
San Francisco Police Department.” ey concluded that the
disparities in booking charges were one of the largest factors
contributing to racial disparities in San Francisco’s criminal
justice system as a whole.
In San Francisco and elsewhere, booking ocers (the po-
lice ocers who formally le the initial charge) have a high
degree of discretion when determining the booking charge.
Specically, when a law enforcement ocer in the eld
makes an arrest they can either cite and release the arrestee
(for certain low level-misdemeanors), or book the arrestee
into county jail. When the arresting law enforcement agency
transfers custody of the arrestee to the Sheri (who runs the
jail), it must provide the legal basis for the persons incarcer-
ation: the booking charge(s). us, typically, the ocer who
delivers the arrestee to the jail tells the booking deputy at
the jail on what charges they are booked. ere is virtually
no oversight or feedback mechanism on the discretion to
choose booking charges. So, for example, in a case where
a person is arrested with a single illegal rearm, the arrest-
ing ocer could choose to book the person on charges for
three separate guns (or, in an extreme case, even murder).2
In reviewing the case, the District Aorneys oce should,
in theory, discharge any inated charges and rebook the
arrestee on charges which are actually based in the evidence,
but by that stage the risk assessment algorithm has already
generated its recommendation using the booking charges as
an input.
Many tools, like the PSA, nevertheless rely on the pre-
conviction charges as an input because of the need to gener-
ate risk reports quickly. ere is typically a delay of approxi-
mately 48 hours3 between the time of booking into jail and
the District Aorneys decision about whether and what
les to charge (rebooking). One of the goals of incorporating
risk assessment into the pre-trial process is to expedite the
release of low-risk arrestees. If the algorithms could not be
run until the district aorney had made a rebooking decision,
everyone would have to wait in jail for days. us, to eec-
tuate speedy release for some, the PSA relies on the police
booking charge to generate reports within 24 hours, while
the district aorney is still considering rebooking.
e ultimate objective of this analysis is to assess how
oen “unfair” booking charges caused the PSA to recommend
excessively restrictive conditions of pre-trial supervision.
To do this, we dene unfair booking charges to be those
charges associated with the PSA that do not go on to result
in a conviction. Implicitly, this assumes that the conviction
charges (the charges to which the person pleads or is found
guilty) are a fair and accurate representation of the person’s
2While this sounds extreme, this example is based on one of the authors’
experience as a public defender.
3Penal Code section 825
criminal activity. We acknowledge that this measure of the
true severity of the crimes is imperfect.
On the one hand, there may exist cases where a defendant
did commit the crime on which they are booked, and the
defense just barely establishes reasonable doubt leading to
an acquial for those charges. It may seem disingenuous to
label such charges unfair or unsubstantiated. On the other
hand, as discussed in [12] and the many citations therein,
“initial appraisals of dangerousness and culpability may send
signals to later system actors, seing into motion a dynamic
paern of cascading disadvantage.” For example, the rebook-
ing charges are oen identical to the booking charges. e
rebooking charges then dene the starting place from which
plea deals are negotiated. Higher booking charges may fol-
low the defendant through the whole plea process, with
the plea deals they are oered being anchored to the initial
charges, reducing the chances that they are oered deals
with less severe charges.
Relatedly, many recent studies have found that pre-trial
detention causes defendants to accept guilty pleas to charges
that they otherwise would not have been convicted of had
they been free pre-trial [6, 8, 13, 14, 20]. To the extent that
the risk assessment is heeded by judges, booking charges
that cause the tool to make more restrictive supervision
recommendations might then indirectly be causing those
charges to be “substantiated” through a guilty plea. Although
conviction charges are an imperfect ground truth in that
they likely exhibit similar (though hopefully less severe)
biases to the booking charges, we believe this is the best
measure of appropriate charges possible given the data we
have available.
3 THE PSA
e PSA developed by Arnold Ventures is a popular pre-
trial risk assessment tool that is intended to “reduce the
burden placed on vulnerable populations at the forefront
of the criminal justice process.” [4] It has been adopted by
more than 40 jurisdictions around the country [17]. e
purpose of the tool is to make recommendations about the
appropriate level of pre-trial supervision for people who
have been arrested.
In this section, we describe the PSA as it was administered
during the period of our study. Since then, Arnold Ventures
has modied its terminology for some of the components
of the PSA as well as some of the procedures for translating
the risk scores to recommendations.4 However, it is not
mandatory that jurisdictions adopt the revised version, and
many jurisdictions remain using a version similar to that
4As we describe each component of the version of the PSA as it existed dur-
ing the period under study, we will highlight analogues to each component
under the new version of the PSA.
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described below. In fact, the version of the PSA described
here is still in use in San Francisco.
In order to create a risk prole for a newly arrested person
and pre-trial supervision recommendation, the tool combines
several separate predictions: risk of failure to appear at a
future court date (FTA), risk of re-arrest for new criminal
activity (NCA), and risk of re-arrest for new violent criminal
activity (NVCA).
Each of the predictions are calculated as a function of
some subset of the following:
• age at current arrest,
• whether there are pending charges at the time of the
current oense,
• whether the arrested person has any prior misde-
meanor convictions,
• whether the arrested person has any prior felony
convictions,
• whether the arrested person has any prior convic-
tions (misdemeanor or felony),
• the number of prior violent convictions,
• the number of prior failures to appear for court dates
in the past two years,
• whether the person failed to appear prior to two
years before the oense,
• whether the individual has been incarcerated as the
result of a conviction in the past,
• whether the current booked oense is considered
violent.
Violent charges are determined by inclusion on the ex-
tensive PSA Violent Oense list for California. We include
a representative list of charges that appear on the violent
oense list in Table 5 in the appendix. Both FTA and NCA
predictions are conveyed on a six point scale, with higher
values corresponding to a higher predicted likelihood of the
corresponding undesirable outcome. e NVCA prediction
is a binary prediction, with a value of one (sometimes called
a NVCA ag or violence ag) corresponding to a higher pre-
dicted likelihood of future arrest for a violent crime. Each of
these predictions are calculated as a linear combination of
integer valued weights. is information and information
on the weights associated with each factor for each type of
prediction as well as extensive documentation around the
implementation of the tool is available on Arnold Ventures
portal5 in the Guide to the Release Conditions Matrix [21].
Calculating the FTA, NCA, and NVCA sub-scores con-
stitutes step (1) of a four-step process. In the subsequent
three steps, these risk scores are combined with the booking
charges using pre-dened sets of rules to transform the risk
scores into recommendations.
In step (2) of the PSA, three determinations are made:
5hps://www.psapretrial.org/about/factors.
• whether the person was extradited for the current
booked oense;
• whether current booked oense is among the follow-
ing oenses or is a conspiracy, aempt, solicitation,
or FTA of any for those oenses;
– Murder
– Voluntary Manslaughter
– Aggravated Mayhem
– Torture
– Felony Sexual Assault
– Robbery
– Carjacking
– Felony Domestic Violence
– Felony Stalking
– Violation of a Domestic Violence Protective Or-
der
– Escape
• whether the current booked oense is deemed vio-
lent according to the California PSA List of Violent
Oenses and the NVCA ag calculated in step (1) is
indicated.
If any of these conditions are true, the individual is au-
tomatically given a “Release Not Recommended” (the most
restrictive possible recommendation) and the assessment
need not continue. is is called a “charge-based exclusion,”
and we refer to charges that trigger a charge-based exclu-
sion as “exclusion charges.” 6 If no charge-based exclusion is
made, the assessment continues to step (3).
In step (3), the six point NCA and FTA predictions are
combined using the Decision Making Framework (DMF)
shown in Figure 1 to arrive at what we refer to as an “initial
recommendation.”7 Each cell in the matrix corresponds to
a recommended level of supervision. For example, if an
individual has an FTA prediction of 2 and a NCA prediction
of 3, one would nd the entry in the DMF in the second
row and third column to arrive at an initial recommendation
of OR-NAS, the lowest recommended level of supervision
possible.
6Under the new version of the PSA, there is no longer a charge-based
exclusion as a formal step in the process. e analogue to charge-based
exclusions now fall under “additional guidance.” For example, in a sample
PSA given in [21], the guidebook gives an example of additional guidance
to augment the PSA as “If the current charge is a rst- or second-degree
violent felony, the person may be placed on Release Level 3 (the highest
release level), regardless of the PSA scores.” is is analogous to a step (2)
exclusion under the version of the PSA described here.
7is terminology may be confusing, as this comes aer step (2) so chrono-
logically in some sense is not initial. By this we mean to say that this is
the recommendation that would be given without considering any charge-
based amendments to the recommendation. is can be calculated even if
an individual has a charge-based exclusion.
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Figure 1: Decision Making Framework used in San
Francisco pilot study. is matrix translates the em-
pirical risk estimates of NCA and FTA into policy rec-
ommendations about the appropriate level of pre-trial
supervision for a person with that estimated risk pro-
le.
In this implementation of the tool, the possible levels of
supervision in the DMF in order of increasing level of su-
pervision were: (1) No Active Supervision– release on own
recognizance and receive court reminders (OR-NAS); (2) Min-
imum Supervision– release on own recognizance with court
reminders and twice weekly phone reporting (OR-Minimum);
(3) Assertive Case Management– release on own recogni-
zance or under supervision, including court date reminders,
four times weekly reporting with two to four of those times
reporting in person, and an out of custody needs assessment
(SFPDP-ACM); and, (4) Release not Recommended.8
Finally, in step (4), two more determinations are made:
• whether the current booked oense is among the
following charges or the current booked oense is
a solicitation, conspiracy, aempt or FTA for any of
the charges on that list;
– Violation of other Protective Orders
– Person to Person Sex Crime
– Arson
– Involved the Use of a Weapon, Caustic Chemi-
cal, Flammable Substance, or Explosive,
8What is referred to as the decision-making framework (DMF) in this section
has a direct analogue in the new version of the PSA called the Release Con-
ditions Matrix (RCM). One important dierentiator between the versions
is that in the version described here, the DMF may recommend pre-trial
detention. Under the new version with the RCM, according to [21] “Deten-
tion is not included in the matrix because eligibility for detention is based
on state law, and the matrix becomes relevant only aer a judicial ocer
decides a person will be released.”
– Felony inicting Great Bodily Injury
– Misdemeanor Domestic Violence
– Misdemeanor Stalking
• whether the current booked charge is not on the list
of violent oenses but the NVCA ag was triggered.
If either of these conditions are true, the initial recommen-
dation is increased one level. For example, if the initial rec-
ommendation was OR-NAS, it is increased to OR-Minimum.
is recommendation is then the nal pre-trial supervision
recommendation. 9 We refer to this as a “charge-based
bump-up” and charges that trigger a charge-based bump-up
as “bump-up charges.”
In summary, abandoning jargon and simplifying to the
extent possible, we conceptualize the process as follows:
an individual’s initial recommended level of supervision is
determined by combining predictions about their likelihood
of FTA and NCA (predictions that do not rely on charge-
based information). If there are very serious booking charges
(i.e. exclusion charges) or the booking charges are violent
and the person is predicted to have a higher likelihood of re-
arrest for a violent crime, then the individual is automatically
recommended for the highest level of supervision. If there are
moderately serious booking charges (i.e. bump-up charges)
or the individual is predicted to have a higher likelihood of
re-arrest for a violent crime despite the current charges not
being violent, then the initial recommendation is increased
to the next highest level.
4 DATA
In collaboration with the SFPD, we obtained data collected
during San Francisco’s pilot study of the PSA. is study was
conducted over the period from mid-2016 to mid-2017. Dur-
ing this time period, the SFPD saved PSAs for their clients
as scanned image les. From the SFPD, we obtained 2450
of these les, the information from which was manually en-
tered into a spreadsheet. e following elds were collected
from each PSA: the defendant’s unique identication number,
name, date of birth, arrest date, date on which the PSA was
conducted, NVCA prediction, NCA prediction, FTA predic-
tion, a list of booked charges and corresponding charge codes,
the recommendation of the PSA, an indicator of whether the
recommendation was the result of charge-based exclusion,
and an indicator of whether a charge-based bump-up was
applied to the recommendation. We also recorded several of
9Similar to step (2), step (4) increases are now included under “additional
guidance” rather than as a formalized step. For example, in the sample PSA
given in [21], “If there is an NVCA ag, consider increasing the persons
release level by one level” is given as an example of additional guidance
that could be included. is is analogous to the step (4) increase given here,
though less formalized.
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the individual risk factors listed on the PSA for each defen-
dant: age at current oense, prior conviction (misdemeanor
or felony), and prior violent conviction.
We separately obtained data from San Francisco’s court
databases on all defendants who interacted with the court
system during the time period of the pilot program. For
each defendant, we obtained a unique identication number,
name, date of birth, list of booking charges, list of charges
led by the district aorney, and the disposition code for each
individual charge. e disposition codes dene whether each
charge resulted in a conviction and are the basis on which we
retrospectively calculate which charges were substantiated
and which were not.
5 ANALYSIS
Our analysis consists of three parts: de-duplication and
record-linkage; validation; and counterfactual analysis. e
goal of the de-duplication and record linkage is to ensure that
each arrest only appears once in our dataset and that each ar-
rest record in the PSA data is linked to the correct court case
in the court data. is linkage allows us to see whether the
booking charges included in each PSA ultimately resulted
in a conviction, information that is only contained in the
court records. It also provides us additional demographic
information about the people who were assessed by the PSA.
e result of this step is one unied dataset that contains one
copy of each PSA that was administered during the pilot pro-
gram, the outcome of all charges associated with each PSA,
and additional demographic information about the individ-
ual to whom each PSA pertains. In completing this process,
we drop 64 records due to incompleteness, 419 records as
duplicates10, and 31 records due to an inability to establish a
denitive match in the court data. In the end, this leaves us
with 1916 records with which to do the analysis. Details of
the decision rules used to de-duplicate and match are found
in Section A of the appendix.
In the validation phase, we create PSA-reproduction code
and verify that our code accurately reproduces the outputs
of the human-administered PSA when given the same inputs.
To do this, we apply our PSA-reproduction code to the linked
dataset described above. is code takes the FTA and NCA
predictions11, several variables measuring criminal history,
and the booking charges as listed in the court records. It then
outputs each of the components of the PSA: a charge-based
exclusion indicator, a charge-based bump-up indicator, a
10Many of the dropped records pertain to the same few arrests, which it
seems were each saved multiple times.
11Because the FTA and NCA predictions do not depend on booking charge,
these are held constant and we need not re-calculate them. at is, we do
not need to verify that we can reproduce them, as this analysis pertains
only to eects driven by perturbations of the booking charges, and these
predictions do not change as a function of the booking charges.
violence ag, and a nal recommendation. We then compare
each of these outputs to those same components as recorded
on the original PSA forms. A high rate of agreement assures
that our code is accurately representing the PSA.
We nd that our calculation of the NVCA ag agrees with
that listed on the PSA form for 99.3% of the cases in our
dataset. With regard to charge-based exclusions, we nd
that our reproduction is in agreement with the original PSA
data for 99.4% of the records. In the PSA, calculating the
charge-based bump-up is not necessary if an exclusion is
determined because the recommended level of supervision
cannot further be increased. For this reason, we compare
our reproduction of charge-based bump-ups to the PSA data
only for those records for which a charge-based exclusion
was not indicated in the original PSA data. We nd that
our reproduction is in agreement with the original admin-
istration of the PSA for 99.7% of these records. Finally, we
compare our calculation of the nal recommendation to the
recommendation given in the PSA data. We nd an agree-
ment of 97.4%, which is slightly lower than for the other
components. Nearly all of the disagreements occurred for
individuals who fell within the one specic cell of the DMF
which required additional determinations to be made (an
FTA of 5 and a NCA of 4, shown as the split cell in Figure
1). Based on a manual review, we believe there may have
been diering interpretations by the sta administering the
PSA as to how these determinations should be applied. In
any case, for those cases that do not fall into this cell of the
DMF, our reproduction of the nal recommendation is in
agreement with that listed on the PSA form 99.5% of the time.
A full discussion of the validation process is given in Section
B of the appendix.
Finally, having veried that our code accurately repro-
duces the PSA, we apply our PSA-reproduction code to a
counterfactual scenario in which only the charges that re-
sulted in a conviction are used in the calculation of the PSA.
is results in two sets of calculations to compare: (a) the
PSA’s recommendation (and each of its components) based
on the booking charges, and (b) the PSA’s recommenda-
tion (and each of its components) based only on conviction
charges. To evaluate the impact that unsubstantiated charges
had on the PSA, we compare calculations (a) and (b).
6 RESULTS
In this section, we compare the results of the PSA calculated
using the conviction charges to the results of the PSA calcu-
lated using the booking charges.12 roughout this section,
12We do not compare to the original PSA results directly to isolate the
eect of altering the input charges. If we compared to the original PSA
components, some of the dierences we identify may, in fact, be due to
some of the dierences in interpretation we highlighted in the validation
section above.
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the results presented pertain only to the cases for which
all charges had been disposed (or seled) at the time of the
analysis, which includes 88.3% of the records.
ere is some nuance around which charges should count
as convictions. For example, sometimes multiple cases are
bundled into a single plea agreement. Should all charges as-
sociated with that bundle be counted as conviction charges
or only those conviction charges that are part of the case
originally associated with the administration of the PSA?
Ultimately, we decided that only charges that pertain directly
to the arrest that triggered the administration of the PSA
ought to be eligible, though we acknowledge that others
might disagree with this denition. us, for the purposes
of this analysis, we dene “conviction charges” to be those
charges associated with the arrest that triggered the adminis-
tration of the PSA for which the arrestee was found or plead
guilty.13
is denition creates some situations where a case out-
come indicates that the individual pleaded guilty to other
charges, but none of the charges to which they pleaded guilty
are associated with the original case. In this scenario, the
conviction-charge-PSA is calculated as though there were
no charges eligible to trigger charge-based exclusions, bump-
ups, or to be considered violent, despite the fact the indi-
vidual was convicted on some charges (just none that were
led as part of the case associated with their PSA form). We
performed additional analysis removing all cases for which
a guilty plea was indicated but the individual did not plead
guilty to any of the charges associated with the original case.
While the exact numbers were lower than those presented in
the remainder of this section, qualitatively the results were
the same.
Table 1 shows the rate of charge-based exclusions, bump-
ups, NVCA ags, and the average recommendation level
when calculating each of the components of the PSA. e
average recommendation level is based on mapping each
level of supervision to its numeric rank: the lowest level of
supervision is mapped to one, the second to two, etc. e
Charges column gives the charges used to calculate the PSA–
either booking charges or conviction charges. e dier-
ence between the rate calculated under the booking charges
and the rate calculated under the conviction charges is also
shown. To test for statistical signicance between the compo-
nents of the PSA under the two input charge conditions, we
13According to the codebook we received, this is all disposition codes greater
than 159. Additionally, by manual review, we have found that cases in
which the case is listed as resolved, if some charges associated with a case
number have disposition code 72 (plead guilty to other charges) and others
charge codes associated with that same case number have disposition code
0, those with disposition code 0 are the ones the individual was convicted
of. is was conrmed on several cases by looking at alternative sources
of information available in other systems that are not in a database form
amenable to statistical analysis.
performed standard statistical hypothesis tests. When com-
paring the rate of exclusions under booking charges to the
rate of exclusions under conviction charges we perform a dif-
ference of proportion test. To compare the recommendations,
we performed a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, as the recommen-
dations are ordered categorical. Statistical signicance at
the α < 0.001 level is indicated by ‘∗’ for the dierences
shown in the results tables.14 We see that the rate at which
charge-based exclusions, bump-ups, and NVCA ags occur is
much higher when we consider booking charges relative to
when we consider conviction charges as inputs. e average
level of recommended pre-trial supervision is also elevated
under the calculation using the booking charges relative to
that using the conviction charges.
Charges exclusions bump-ups nvca rec
Conviction 8.7 9.1 9.3 2.5
Booking 29.4 23.7 20.2 3
Dierence 20.7 * 14.6 * 10.8 * 0.5 *
Table 1: Percent of cases with exclusions, bump-ups,
nvca ags, and the average recommendation by input
charges.
Table 2 shows the proportion of people who received
a charge-based exclusion, a charge-based bump-up, or an
NVCA ag when the PSA was calculated using the booking
charges but not when it was calculated using the conviction
charges. It also shows the percent of people who received a
recommendation for more restrictive conditions under the
booking charges than under the conviction charges.15 We
nd that a substantial portion of the cases (nearly 30%) would
have had a lower recommended level of supervision if their
PSA had been based only on the charges they were ultimately
convicted of.
exclusions bump-ups nvca rec
20.9 17.0 10.9 27.4
Table 2: Percent of cases for which each PSA compo-
nent was higher under the booking charges than un-
der the conviction charges.
Next we turn to understanding whether overbooking’s
eect on the PSA diers by race group. For this analysis,
we disaggregate the data into two race categories: Black
14All p-values are signicant at at least the 0.001 level, even aer a Bonfer-
roni correction for multiplicity.
15is is dierent than what is shown in Table 1, as under the former
calculation, cases in which the individual was convicted of more severe
charges than those under which they were booked oset cases where the
reverse occurs.
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and non-Black. is is an obvious over-simplication, as is
any racial categorization. However, based on our analysis of
the consistency of racial classication within the court data,
we have determined this categorization scheme introduces
the fewest problems with inconsistent classication. A full
discussion of how we arrived at this decision is available in
the appendix.
Table 3 shows equivalent quantities to those shown in
Table 1, now disaggregated into the two race groups. We
nd that overbooking had a larger impact on the rate of
charge-based exclusions and the assignment of the NVCA
ag for Black people than non-Black people in this data.
It had a larger impact on charge-based bump-ups on the
non-Black population. However, the impact of overbook-
ing on the ultimate recommendation is, roughly speaking,
similar between the two groups. e proportion of cases
for which charge-based overrides, bump-ups, NVCA ags
were triggered or the recommendation was higher under
the conviction charges than under the booking charges is
given in Table 4 disaggregated by race. Under this summary
of the data, we again see that unsubstantiated charges led
to charge-based exclusions at a higher rate for Black defen-
dants than non-Black defendants. However, there is lile
dierence between the groups in terms of the impact of un-
substantiated charges on charge-based bump-ups or on the
nal recommendation.
Charges group exclusions bump-ups nvca rec
Conviction non-black 7.9 8.2 7.7 2.4
Conviction black 9.7 10.3 11.5 2.6
Booking non-black 25.9 23.2 15.9 2.9
Booking black 33.9 24.3 25.7 3.1
Dierence non-black 18 * 15 * 8.2 * 0.5 *
Dierence black 24.2 * 14.1 * 14.2 * 0.5 *
Table 3: Comparison of eects of charges on compo-
nents of PSA by race for all disposed cases in data
group exclusions bump-ups nvca rec
non-black 18.1 17.0 8.2 27.5
black 24.5 16.9 14.5 27.2
Table 4: Percent of cases by defendant race with
a charge-based exclusion, charge-based bump-up,
NVCA ag, or higher recommendations due to unsub-
stantiated booking charges.
To understand how this seemingly paradoxical result is
possible, we must rst recognize that there are instances
where an individual can have an “unfair” charge-based ex-
clusion or bump-up that does not translate to an “unfair”
recommendation. Recall that each of these charge-based
components results in an increase to the recommended level
of supervision above and beyond the initial recommendation.
Consider, for example, an individual whose initial recom-
mendation is the highest level and who has exclusion or
bump-up charges at booking that they are not convicted
of. is individual would be classied as having an unfair
exclusion or bump-up. However, because their initial rec-
ommendation was maximal, whether we calculate the PSA
using the booking charges (which would include an exclusion
or a bump-up) or we calculate it using only the conviction
charges (which would not include an exclusion or bump-up),
the recommendation is the same. In the former case, the
initial recommendation was maximal and applying the ex-
clusion or bump-up did not increase the recommendation,
as it could not further increase. In the laer case, we do
not apply the exclusion or bump-up, and the recommenda-
tion is still the highest category. us, even if exclusion or
bump-up booking charges are unsubstantiated, the ultimate
recommendation does not change based on those charges for
people whose initial recommendation is the highest level. In-
dividuals in this category contribute to the disparity shown
under exclusions and bump-ups in Tables 3 and 4 and do not
contribute to any dierence in recommendations.
Similarly, consider a second scenario where an individual
has an initial recommendation of SFPDP-ACM, the second
highest level of supervision. If this person is booked under
an exclusion charge that is reduced to a bump-up charge
that they are convicted of, in both cases, the nal recom-
mendation will be the highest level of supervision. To break
this down further, under the booking charges, they receive
an exclusion and are automatically moved to the highest
category, Release Not Recommended. Under the conviction
charges, they receive a charge-based bump-up, which be-
cause they began in the second-highest category, also results
in a Release Not Recommended recommendation. us, un-
der both the booking charges and the conviction charges,
their recommendation will be the same, though they will
still be classied as having had an unfair exclusion.
Both scenarios where unfair exclusion charges do not ma-
terialize into unfair recommendations are only possible when
the individual has an initial recommendation that is either
the highest category or the second highest category. In the
population examined here, the distribution of initial scores
was shied higher for the Black individuals than the non-
Black individuals. See Figure 2, which shows the distribution
of initial scores broken down into Black and non-Black peo-
ple. Depending on the denition of fairness adopted, this
group-wise distributional dierence may itself be indicative
of unfairness in the model. However, because our goal is
to study the eect of overbooking in isolation, we do not
further delve into this other than to note this disparity in
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the rate at which Black versus non-back people are recom-
mended for pre-trial detention. Regardless, because Black
defendants were more likely to fall into the highest or second
highest category before any charge-based amendments were
made, Black defendants who had unfair charge-based exclu-
sions were more likely to not have those unfair charge-based
exclusions impact their nal recommendation.
Figure 2: Distribution of initial recommendation, dis-
aggregated into Black and non-Black people.
It is important to note that this conclusion only holds for
this particular DMF, the matrix that translates raw predic-
tions of FTA and NCA into initial recommendations. In a
jurisdiction with a dierent DMF under which fewer combi-
nations of risk scores correspond to the highest or second-
highest level of supervision, it is possible that the racial
disparities in unwarranted charge-based exclusions, bump-
ups, and NVCA ags might, in fact, translate to disparities
in the recommendations as well. us, jurisdictions seeking
to amend their DMF (or similarly, their release recommenda-
tion matrices) should be aware of this possibility: changes to
the release recommendations that are intended to result in
a greater rate of release may introduce a racial skew in the
impact of overbooking where one previously did not exist.
7 LIMITATIONS
Perhaps most obviously, one limitation of this analysis is that
it was done using a fairly small sample size with a limited
scope of the cases it covers. is sample may not include all
of the PSAs administered during the time period. In order
to generalize the ndings here, one would need to repeat
the analysis using data from a broader geographic range and
preferably across a longer time horizon.
Additionally, as with many endeavors to measure crim-
inality, our measure is imperfect. As discussed in the in-
troduction, higher booking charges may translate to higher
conviction charges, as later stages of the criminal justice
process anchoring to the booking charges. is would cause
our analysis to understate the impact of overbooking. e
other side of the argument is that because we have excluded
conviction charges that are associated with other cases, even
when the individual pleaded guilty to those charges as part
of a joint deal covering both the case we consider and the
case containing the conviction charges, we are understating
the extent of guilty charges that ought to count. is would
lead to us overstating the extent of overbooking. In the end,
there is no perfect measure of criminal behavior, and we
believe the measure we have chosen is reasonable.
Finally, we have analyzed the risk assessment in isolation,
rather than taking a more holistic approach to analyzing its
role within the larger system. For example, we have pre-
sented no analysis of the impact of overbooking on judicial
decision-making nor analyzed the eect on downstream out-
comes like recidivism. In order to understand the real world
consequences of overbooking on the individuals evaluated
by the risk assessment, more investigation is needed. In this
vein, the observed lack of racial disparity in the extent to
which overbooking impacts the tool’s nal recommenda-
tion should not be taken as denitive proof that overbooking
does not have a racially disparate impact on judicial decision-
making. Each component of the PSA we have evaluated is
displayed on the sheet available to judges. It is possible that
the presence of a charge-based exclusion, bump-up, or NVCA
ag inuences the judge’s decision-making independent of
the tool’s nal recommendation. If this is so, then the nd-
ing that overbooking impacted charge-based exclusions at
a higher rate for Black than non-Black individuals, for ex-
ample, might actually result in a meaningful dierence in
terms of the impact of overbooking on the judge’s decision.
is despite the fact that we observed no dierence between
race groups in the impact of overbooking on the nal rec-
ommendation of the tool. Without data on what decisions
judges made when presented with these evaluations, we can-
not say what impact overbooking had on the decisions at an
aggregate level or disaggregated by race.
8 CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the eect of overbooking on a popular
risk assessment tool, Arnold Ventures’ PSA. We have found
that for around 27% of the cases analyzed, charges for which
the person was not ultimately convicted caused the tool
to issue a recommendation for pre-trial supervision that
was more restrictive than would have been issued had such
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charges not been included as inputs to the model. At a more
granular level, we have found that a signicant portion of
the population that was evaluated by the tool, between 10-
20%, received charge-based exclusions, charge-based bump-
ups, and NVCA ags also based upon charges that were
ultimately unsubstantiated by the courts. Disaggregating the
analysis by race shows that while Black individuals received
unwarranted charge-based exclusions and NVCA ags at a
higher rate than non-Black individuals, they did not receive
increased recommendations at a substantially higher rate
due to the fact that Black individuals were more likely to be
classied in the higher risk groups even before charge-based
increases are applied. is nding in and of itself may be
worrisome to those who hope that risk assessment will close
the racial gap in criminal justice outcomes.
is work also naturally raises the question of how one
might protect against charges that will ultimately not re-
sult in convictions impacting an individual’s pre-trial release
recommendation. It is not possible to wait until a case is
resolved to use only conviction charges to compute a recom-
mendation for pre-trial release conditions, as by denition,
by that time the pre-trial period has come to a close. One
possible mitigation is to have a defendant advocate present
earlier in the process to help catch charges for which the
early evidence is lacking. is may be dicult in practice,
as the police report is typically not wrien at the time the
PSA is administered. Without the police report, a defendant
advocate may not have sucient information to assess the
strength of the evidence for each of the charges.
is work also reveals one possibility for gaming the risk
assessment. In theory, in cases where there is ambiguity
as to which charges are appropriate for a given observed
behavior, a booking ocer could opt to book under more
serious charges with the intention of inducing a more re-
strictive detention decision. is could be monitored by
tracking the ratio of similar higher and lower charges over
time and across protected group status. A heightened ratio
may indicate strategic behavior intended to prompt higher
recommendations by the tool.
is possibility points to the fragility of such models under
highly discretionary inputs. In our view, this raises ques-
tions about the appropriateness of their use in high stakes
seings without adequate controls and accountability for the
inputs. In particular, we believe this reveals the importance
of increased accountability and feedback for ocers who sys-
tematically overbook. is is especially important if booking
charges are to be legitimized by their use as inputs to the tool,
the output of which— though directly dependent on booking
charges— may not be viewed with the same level of skepti-
cism as the charges themselves might be. One potentially
revealing line of future research would be to disaggregate
the impact of overbooking by booking ocer as a means
to determine if particular ocers’ booking decisions are
routinely unfairly impacting the tool’s pre-trial supervision
recommendations. Holding such individuals accountable for
their booking decisions may encourage more conservative
decisions around booking arrested people on heightened
charges, reducing the impact of overbooking even beyond
the risk assessment.
Finally, while judges have the power to set more restrictive
conditions of release for people booked on certain serious
charges, these types of charges do not necessarily correlate
with an increased risk of undesirable outcomes. Embedding
charge-based considerations within the nal recommenda-
tion may communicate to judges that merely having been
booked on such charges increases an individual’s empirical
risk level when, in fact, such overrides are an instantiation
of a policy driven by politics rather than being directly tied
to an individual’s risk. Given the large impact of charging
decisions on the output of the tool, it is critical that judges
understand this distinction in order to properly discount
increased recommendations that are based on questionably
or weakly supported charges.
A DE-DUPLICATION AND
RECORD-LINKAGE
To operationalize the denition of “fair” booking charges we
have adopted, we must track down the outcome of the case
associated with each PSA. is requires linking the court
records, which contain outcome status by charge, to the PSA
data. In this process, we only consider records for which
the full PSA was completed. We exclude any PSA records
missing inputs for any of the PSA components, such as arrest
date and any of the PSA predictions (FTA, NCA, NCVA). We
also check that each complete record in the PSA data is
unique in a process called de-duplication. We dene two
records as pertaining to the same incident if both records are
for the same individual (have the same SFID), were recorded
on the same day, and list the same charge(s). If there are
multiple records of the same individual on the same day with
the same charge(s), we retain only one copy.
To match the PSA data to the court data, for each PSA
record, we rst identify all court numbers (a unique identier
of a case— one individual can have multiple court numbers)
that list the same SFID and an arrest date within one day
before to two days aer that listed in the PSA record. is
determines the initial set of potential matches. For the vast
majority of PSAs, there is only one case in this set, and it
is declared the match. If there are multiple court numbers
that meet these criteria, we select the court number(s) with
the charges that most closely match those listed on the PSA
using the following procedure.
We determine whether each potential match in the court
records contains the charge code listed as the top charge
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on the PSA form. If only one of the potential matches does,
this is declared the match. If multiple potential matches
contain the charge code listed rst on the PSA, we repeat
this using the second listed charge code if one exists. In
most cases, there is only one court number that matches on
both rst and second charges and it is declared the match. If
there are multiple, we declare all of them to be matches, and
all charges associated with the matched court numbers are
included in our calculations.
For those records for which this process found no match,
we manually search through the court records to identify an
appropriate match. ere are several idiosyncratic reasons
why matches were not found using our automated procedure.
For example, in one case, the day and month of arrest had
been transposed in the PSA data relative to the court data,
i.e. they used dierent date formats. We consider this and
other similar errors to be simple recording errors, and we
manually determined a match on a case-by-case basis. In
the end, despite our best eorts to nd a match in the court
records for every PSA, there were 31 PSA records for which
we were unable to denitively nd a match, and these were
dropped from the analysis.
B VALIDATION OF OUR REPRODUCTION
OF THE PSA
Using the matched data, we conrm that our code is able
to reproduce the results of the PSA based on the booking
charges listed in the court data. We wrote a function that
takes as input the PSA’s NCA and FTA predictions (which are
not a function of booking charge so will not be sensitive to
changes to this input), the factors used to calculate the NVCA
ag (which is dependent on booking charges), and the list of
booking charges as taken from the court records. Sometimes,
this diers from the booking charges listed on the PSA form.
As output, it returns our calculations for the NVCA ag,
an indicator of a charge-based exclusion, an indicator of a
charge-based bump-up, and the nal recommendation.
B.1 NVCA ag
We follow the procedure to calculate the NVCA ag as out-
lined in the PSA Portal. One of the inputs to the NVCA ag
is whether the booking charge is violent. For each PSA in
our dataset, we compare the booking charges listed in the
court records to the California PSA List of Violent Charges.
If any of the booking charges are present on the list, we
calculate the NVCA ag as though the current oense is
violent. All other non-charge-based inputs to the NVCA ag
are taken directly from the original PSA form. We nd that
our calculation of the NVCA ag agrees with that listed on
the PSA form for 99.3% of the cases in our dataset.
B.2 Charge-based exclusions and
bump-ups
In cases where there was a discrepancy between our code
and what appears on the human-administered PSA, we did
a manual review. In most cases, the discrepancy was due
to a slightly dierent set of booking charges listed in the
court records than were listed on the PSA form. In other
cases, we believe it was due to inconsistency in how the PSA
administrators handled ambiguous instructions. For example,
recall that a charge-based bump-up is indicated if the booking
charge “involved the Use of a weapon, caustic chemical,
ammable substance, or explosive.” ere were some cases
in the PSA data where an individual received a bump-up
based on a charge of wielding an imitation rearm (417.4
PC). Other cases that included this charge did not receive
a bump-up, which we believe indicates some inconsistency
in how bump-ups were applied with respect to this charge
due to the ambiguity around whether an imitation rearm
should be considered a rearm. Similar inconsistencies were
noted around the interpretation of whether carrying a loaded
rearm (25850(A) PC) counted as “Use of a weapon” for the
purposes of a charge-based bump-ups.
B.3 Final recommendation
Finally, we compare our calculation of the nal recommen-
dation to the recommendation given in the PSA data. We
nd an agreement of 97.4%, which is slightly lower than for
the other components. Further inspection reveals that the
majority of the disagreements occur in the case when the
FTA prediction was 5 and the NCA prediction was 4. is
combination of NCA and FTA scores corresponds to the cell
in the decision-making framework (see Figure 1) where ad-
ditional decision rules are applied, presumably by a human.
For cases that have this combination of NCA and FTA scores,
if any of the booked oenses are a felony or a violent mis-
demeanor as indicated by the PSA Violent Oense List, the
recommendation is “Release Not Recommended.” Otherwise,
the recommendation is “SFPDP-ACM.”
We also manually reviewed several of these disagreements.
In many cases of disagreement, there was a felony charge
that did not appear on the violent oense list. Under the
rule as we interpret it, any felony leads to the increase in
level. We suspect that this rule was sometimes interpreted
to mean that only violent felonies triggered the additional
increase. In any case, for those cases that do not fall into this
cell of the DMF, regarding the nal recommendation, our
reproduction is in agreement with the PSA data 99.5% of the
time.
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C VIOLENT CHARGE LIST
e California PSA violent charge list is the list of charges
used by the PSA to dene violence. is list contains over
200 charge codes, so we do not reproduce the whole list here.
Charge codes are separated on the list into several categories.
For each category of charge that appears on the list, we give
some example charges and their associated charge codes. We
have tried to select charges that are representative of those
that appear in each category without being redundant.
D CONSISTENCY OF RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION IN COURT DATA
In order to break down this analysis by the race of the ar-
rested person, we rst explore how consistently individuals
were assigned to each race category. e court records con-
tain a eld called race which takes values B, C, F, H, I, J, U, W,
and in some cases it is missing. We believe these stand for
Black, Chinese, Filipino, Hispanic, Indian, Japanese, Other,
Unknown, and White, respectively. Some of these categories
(F, I, J) were very rarely used.
To calculate our measure of consistency, we rst restrict
the analysis to all individuals who had more than one arrest
record in the dataset. For each race category (shown in rows
of Table 6), we lter the data to include only individuals who
are listed as that race at least once in the data. Using this
subset, for each individual we calculate the percent of their
records that were classied as each possible race. We then
take an average across all individuals. is serves as our
measure of how consistently the individuals are categorized
into each group. e ijth entry of Table 6 is then the average
percent of records that were classied as the jth race cate-
gory among all individuals who were classied as the ith
race category at least once. e rows do not sum to 100 as
one might expect, due to the omission of rows and columns
corresponding to rare categories and missing values. Look-
ing at the row labeled as B, we see that for an individual
who was categorized as B at least once, on average 98.4%
of their records were labeled as B and 0.4% o their records
were labeled asW . is shows a high level of consistency
in designating people as B. However, for a person labeled
as H at least once, 35.7% of their records were indicated a
W , leading us to conclude there is a reasonably high degree
of variability in how people who may be considered H are
classied. By looking at the diagonal of this table, we see
that the only category that is highly consistent under this
measure is B with approximately 98% agreement, and so
for the analysis presented here, the only race categories we
consider are B and non- B, which we assume to be Black and
non-Black.
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Category Example Charge Example Code
Other oenses against public justice
Resist Police Ocer: Cause Death/Serious
Bodily Injury; reatening witnesses,
victims, or informants; Advocacy to kill or
injure peace ocer
148.10(A) PC F; 140(a)
M; 151
Homicide
Murder rst degree; Gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated; Solicit to
commit murder
187(A) PC F 1; 191.5(A)
PC F; 653F(B) PC F
Mayhem Mayhem; Torture 203PC F; 206PC F
Kidnapping Kidnapping; False imprisonment of ahostage 207(A) PC F; 210.5 PC F
Robbery Robbery: rst degree; Carjacking 211 PC F 1; 215(A) PC F
Aempts to kill
Assault on a public ocial; Aempted
murder of public ocial; Obstructing
railroad track, punishment; rowing
missile at common carrier with bodily
harm
217.1(A) PC F; 217.1(B)
PC F; 218.1 F; 219.1 F
Assaults with intent to commit felony, not
murder
Assault with intent to commit a felony;
Assault to commit a felony during the
commission of rst degree burglary
220 (A)(1) PC F; 220(B)
PC F
False imprisonment and human tracking False imprisonment; Human tracking 236 PC M; 236.1
Assault and baery
Assault; Assault on a peace ocer of a
school district; Assault on a highway
worker; Baery on school employee;
Baery against police, emergency
personnel, etc.; Assault w/rearm on
person; Shooting at an inhabited dwelling,
vehicle, etc.
240 PC M; 241.4 M F;
241.5 M; 241.6 PC M;
243(B) PC M; 245(A)(2)
PC; 246PC F
Rape, abduction, carnal abuse of children
Rape: victim incapable of consent; Sex
intercourse w/a minor less than18; Rape
spouse by force/etc; Aempted lewd
acts/w/child und 14yrs
261(A)(1) PC F; 261.5(A)
PC F; 262(A)(1) PC F;
664/288 (A) PC F
Abandonment and neglect of children
Willful cruelty to child; Injuring a spouse,
cohabitant, ance´, boyfriend, girlfriend or
childs parent; Inict injury upon child
273 A(B) PC M; 273.5
(A) PC M; 273 D(A) PC
M
Bigamy, incest, and crimes against nature
Incest; Sodomy: person under 18;
Lewd/lascivious acts on dependent adult
w/force; Oral copulation; Harmful material
sent w/intent to seduce minor; Sexual
penetration w/foreign object: victim
drugged; Continuous sexual abuse of child
285 PC F; 286(B)(1) PC
F; 288 (B)(2) PC F; 288
A(A) PC F; 288.2 (A) PC
F; 289 (E) PC F; 288.5
(A) PC F
Other injuries to person Poisoning 347(A) PC F
Crimes against elders, dependent adults,
persons with disabilities
Cause harm/death elder dependent adult;
Elder abuse: victim 70/or older
368(B)(1) PC M;
368(b)(2)(B) PC F
Crimes against the public peace Rioting; Exhibit rearm. Drawing,exhibiting, or using a rearm
404(A) PC M; 417 (b)
PC M
Crimes and penalties Violate civil rights by force/threat 422.6(A) PC M
Arson
Arson causing great bodily injury;
Aggravated arson; Causing re of
inhabited structure/property
451(A) PC F; 451.5 (A)
PC F; 452 (B) PC F
Oenses by prisoners Assault by a life prisoner; Escape fromcustody by force and violence 4500 F; 4530(A) PC F
Prevention and abatement of unlawful
activity
Use of a weapon of mass destruction
causing death 11418 (B)(2) PC F
Destructive devices and explosives
generally
Use of destructive device and explosive to
injure/destroy; Explosion causing death 18740 F; 18755 (a) F
Table 5: California PSA Violent Oenses List: representative charges by category12
Race Designation B C H O U W
B 98.40 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40
C 0.50 85.60 0.00 5.90 1.60 3.20
H 0.50 0.00 48.40 4.20 2.80 35.70
O 2.90 14.90 2.90 46.00 3.40 25.90
U 7.70 2.60 9.00 3.80 53.80 16.70
W 0.40 0.10 2.90 1.90 0.40 91.60
Table 6: e expected rate per 100 records at which in-
dividuals which each race designation and more than
one recordwere classied as each possible designation
(columns). For example, for individualswhowere clas-
sied as U at least once and had more than one record
available, on average those individuals had 8 % of their
records listed as B.
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